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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

KEVIN CHUKES,

CaseNo.20020376-CA

Defendant/Appellant.

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from a conviction for Theft by Deception, a second degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405 (1999), Identity Fraud, a second
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-1102 (Supp. 2002), and Forgery, a
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (1999), in the Third
Judicial District Court, State of Utah, the Honorable Ann Boyden, Judge, presiding.1
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2)(e) (Supp. 2002).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE. STANDARD OF REVIEW. AND
PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENT
Issue: Under section 76-1-402 of the Utah Code, a criminal defendant may not be

1

A copy of the Minutes of the "Sentence, Judgment, Commitment" is attached in
Addendum A.

convicted of both a principal crime and lesser-included offenses. Nevertheless, the
defendant in this case was convicted of both the principal crime of theft by deception, and
the lesser-included offenses of identity fraud and forgery. May the convictions for
identity fraud and forgery be sustained?
Standard of Review: The issue in this case revolves around the interpretation of the theft
by deception, identity fraud, and forgery statutes. The inteipretation of these statutes is a
legal analysis that involves no questions of fact. Therefore, this Court reviews "the trial
court's ruling[s] for correctness and gives no deference to its conclusions."2
Preservation: This issue was preserved at R. 173 [98-111].

RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The following statutes are determinative on appeal:
Section 76-1-402 of the Utah Code, "Included Offenses," which is provided in
Addendum B.
Section 76-6-405 of the Utah Code, "Theft by Deception," which provides:
(1) A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises control over property
of another by deception and with a purpose to deprive him thereof.
(2) Theft by deception does not occur, however, when there is only falsity
as to matters having no pecuniary significance, or puffing by statements
unlikely to deceive ordinary persons in the group addressed. "Puffing"
means an exaggerated commendation of wares or worth in communications
addressed to the public or to a class or group.
2

State v. VigiL 842 P.2d 843, 844 (Utah 1992). See also State v. Casev. 2001 UT App
205,116, 29 P.2d 25.
2

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405 (1999).
Section 76-6-1102 of the Utah Code, "Identity Fraud Crime," which is provided in
Addendum C.
Section 76-6-501 of the Utah Code, "Forgery," which is provided in Addendum D.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On March 21, 2001 Appellant Kevin Chukes was charged by information with
theft by deception, identity fraud, and forgery. R. 2-5. He pled not-guilty to the crimes,
and a preliminary hearing was held. R. 29. At the hearing, the court found probable cause
to believe that Mr. Chukes had committed the crimes and he was bound over for trial. R.
172 [21].
The trial was held and evidence was presented. R. 173 [13-90]. After all of the
evidence was submitted, the defense counsel objected to the fact that Mr. Chukes had
been charged with three separate criminal counts for the same act. R. 173 [99-101]. The
defense counsel pointed out that, because Mr. Chukes committed only one criminal act he
should be convicted of only one crime. R. 173 [110-11]. What is more, two of the
charges, identity fraud and forgery, are lesser-included offenses of theft by deception as a
matter of law. Id. However, the court disagreed with these arguments and overruled the
objection. Id. at 107-12.
Mr. Chukes was convicted as charged. R. 115-17. He filed a timely notice of
appeal. R. 159-60.
3

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Mr. Clark Grimshaw, the manager of Crown Bedrooms in Murray, sells heirloomquality bedroom furniture for a living. R. 173 [14]. He was working in his store on the
morning of March 1, 2001, when a man who was neatly-dressed and well-spoken entered.
Id at 16. The man was interested in one of the bedroom sets in the display windows. Id.
at 18. He asked several questions about the furniture. Id In particular, he wanted to know
whether delivery was available that day. Id. Mr. Grimshaw said that the man "was in
some sort of a dilemma that it would solve for him if he made a purchase on that given
day." Id. However, delivery was not available that day, and the set was not currently in
stock. Id. at 21. Nevertheless, Mr. Grimshaw offered to sell the man the display model if
he could make his own delivery arrangements. Id. at 21. The man agreed. Id.
The furniture cost nearly $6,000. Id. at 22; Evid. Env. Ex. 3. It included a bed
priced at $1,500, a mattress priced at $600, a comforter priced at $500, a dresser and
mirror at $2,000, and a vanity at $1,700. R. 173 [22]; Evid. Env. Ex. 3. Mr. Grimshaw
asked the man how he wished to pay for the furniture, and the man said he wanted to
finance it. R. 173 [23]. Mr. Grimshaw gave him a blank credit application and watched
him fill it out. IdL at 24. The man gave his name as "Jeffery Mewborn," andfilledout the
blanks for his social security number, driver's license number, and present and previous
addresses.3 Mr. Grimshaw watched him sign the application. R. 173 [24].
3

Evid. Env. Ex. 2. During Mr. Grimshaw's testimony, the prosecutor referred to the
credit application as "exhibit 1." R. 173 [25-26]. However, the application is marked "exhibit 2"
in the evidence envelope. Evid. Env. Ex. 2. Apparently, the prosecutor either misnumbered the
4

Mr. Grimshaw took the application and explained to the man that he would fax it
to the store's financier, American General, and American General would respond within
five to ten minutes. Id at 25-26. The man replied that he was in a hurry and had to leave.
Id. at 26-27. However, he assured Mr. Grimshaw that he would call the store later to see
whether the application had been accepted. Id.
The man called half an hour later. Id. at 29. Mr. Grimshaw told him the application
had been accepted. Id at 29-30. Mr. Grimshaw also asked when he would be picking up
the furniture. Id at 30. The man replied that he would pick it up as soon as he could. Id.
The man arrived a little after three that afternoon and said that someone would be
coming with a moving van. Id at 31. While they were waiting, Mr. Grimshaw showed the
man the credit contract, which listed the amount of money financed, the finance charge,
and the monthly payment amount. Id, Evid. Env. Ex. 1. The man signed the contract as
"Jeffery Mewborn." Evid. Env. Ex. 1.
Soon after, a young woman arrived driving a moving van. R. 173 [37]. Mr.
Grimshaw and another salesman helped the man carry the furniture out to the van. Id. 3738. Then the man and woman drove away. Id at 39-40.
Within days, Mr. Grimshaw discovered that the man was not Mr. Mewbom, and
that the sale was not legitimate. Ld at 40. The police began an investigation, and asked
Mr. Grimshaw to describe the man who had represented himself as Mr. Mewborn. Id Mr.
exhibits or referred to the wrong numbers by mistake. Later, the court clarified that the credit
application was actually labeled "exhibit 2" and the credit contract was labeled "exhibit 1." R.
173 [33]. Both exhibits were admitted without objection. Id.
5

Grimshaw provided a description. Id. Later, and the police asked him to look at a photo
line-up. Id. at 40-41. A detective prepared the line-up and showed it to Mr. Grimshaw. Id.
at 79-80. Mr. Grimshaw identified Mr. Chukes as the man who had pretended to be Mr.
Mewbom.lcL at 82-83.
At trial, the authentic Mr. Mewborn appeared and testified that he did not know
Mr. Chukes, had not given Mr. Chukes his personal information, and had not given Mr.
Chukes permission to use the information. Id, at 68-69. He also testified that the
signatures on the credit and sales documents were not his, IcL at 69-70, and that he had
never been to Crown Bedrooms nor purchased anything there. Id. at 67-68.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
The theft by deception conviction is the only conviction that should be affirmed in
this case. The other two convictions, forgery and identity fraud, should be vacated for two
reasons. First, they are lesser-included offenses as a matter of law. Second, they are not
independently supported by the evidence.
With regard to the first argument, forgery is a lesser-included offense of both
identity fraud and theft by deception because all of the forgery elements are encompassed
by identity fraud and theft by deception. So, forgery merges into those crimes. Further,
identity fraud is a lesser-included offense of theft by deception, and so it merges into theft
by deception. Accordingly, only the theft by deception conviction remains standing.
Second, the forgery and identity fraud convictions should be vacated because they
6

are supported by the same evidence that supports the theft by deception conviction.
Indeed, there is not one fact supporting forgery and identity fraud that is not necessary to
support the theft by deception conviction. And, each conviction must be supported by at
least some independent evidence. Otherwise, the convictions violate section 76-1-402 of
the Utah Code, which prohibits multiple convictions for the same act. In short, the forgery
and identity fraud convictions are superfluous and should be vacated, leaving only the
theft by deception conviction.

ARGUMENT
MR, CHUKES' CONVICTION ON ALL THREE COUNTS CHARGED IS
ERRONEOUS BECAUSE FORGERY AND IDENTITY FRAUD MERGE.
LEAVING ONLY THEFT BY DECEPTION STANDING
Mr. Chukes committed only one crime. He stole furniture from Crown Bedrooms
by pretending to be Mr. Mewborn, whose credit was acceptable to the store. This is a
punishable crime, but it should not be punished more than once. It was committed with
one purpose, obtaining the furniture, by one method, pretending to be Mr. Mewborn.
Nothing else happened. Without more, the evidence simply is not enough to support three
separate criminal convictions.
More to the point, two of the crimes, identification fraud and forgery, are lesserincluded offenses of the theft by deception. A criminal defendant cannot be convicted of
both a primary crime and lesser-included offenses. The fact-finder must chose between
them. That did not happen in this case. Instead, Mr. Chukes' was convicted of all three
7

crimes. This is illegal, and it compels a vacation of the identity fraud and forgery charges.
This is demonstrated by the law. The double jeopardy clauses of the United States
Constitution and the Utah Constitution prohibit a conviction for both a principal crime
and lesser-included offenses. State v. Ross, 951 P.2d 236, 241 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).
Flowing from the double jeopardy clauses is section 76-1-402 of the Utah Code, which
explains the guidelines for determining when offenses are lesser-included. Under that
section, an offense is a lesser-included if "[i]t is established by proof of the same or less
than all the facts required to establish the commission of the [principal] offense
charged."4

4

Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(3) (1999). It is generally accepted that this statute
originated with the double jeopardy provisions. Ross. 951 P.2d at 241. However, these
provisions are not the only source of lesser-included jurisprudence. The due process and equal
protection provisions also contribute.
Interestingly, while the due process, equal protection, and double jeopardy clauses all
contribute, they are applied in different circumstances with slightly different results. The due
process clause, for instance, is applied when the prosecution seeks to instruct the jury on a
lesser-included offense that was not charged in the Information, In this situation, the principal
crime must be closely compared with the lesser-included to determine whether the lesserincluded is necessarily proven by proof of the principal. State v, Carruth. 1999 UT 107, ^[6; 993
P.2d 869. This stringent procedure is necessary because the due process clause protects a
criminal defendant's right to know the charges against him, and adding an additional charge
during trial may violate this right. Id at ^[6-7. Notably, the procedure is not as stringent when it
is the defendant who requests an instruction on a lesser-included offense. In such circumstances
an instruction on a lesser-included offense may be given if there is any basis for it in the
evidence. Beck v. Alabama. 447 U.S. 625,635-37 (1980); State v. Baker. 671 P.2d 152, 157-58
(Utah 1983).
Under the equal protection clause, the lesser-included offense principal has been treated
differently. This is because the equal protection clause does not focus on the defendant's right to
know the charges against him, but on the idea that similarly-situated persons must be treated
alike. State v. Shondeh 453 P.2d 146,147 (Utah 1969). Accordingly, where acts are punishable
under two separate statutory provisions, only one provision may be applied. State v. Garmbrell
8

In interpreting this section, Utah courts have applied a two-tiered analysis to
identify lesser-included offenses. First, the statutory elements of the crimes are compared.
State v. Hill 674 P.2d 96, 97 (Utah 1983). If one crime "is established by proof of the
same or less than all the facts required to establish the commission" of another, then the
crime is a lesser-included offense of the other. Id. (citation omitted). The lesser-included
relationship has been established between crimes such as robbery and theft,5
communications fraud and forgery,6 kidnaping and false imprisonment,7 larceny and false
pretenses,8 joyriding and vehicle theft,9 and possession of a stolen vehicle and vehicle
theft.10
The second tier of the test involves the facts actually proven at trial. These facts

814 P.2d 1136, 1140 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). Usually, the defendant is entitled to the benefit of the
more lenient statute. ShondeL 453 P.2d at 148.
In this case, neither the due process nor equal protection theories fit. Due process does
not fit because the three charges at issue were all named in the information, and Mr. Chukes was
given notice of them. Likewise, equal protection does not fit because the charges do not punish
similar conduct. They punish graduated conduct. In other words, forgery is necessarily proven by
proof of identity fraud and theft by deception, and identity fraud is necessarily proven by proof
of theft by deception. And so the double jeopardy theory, which prohibits multiple punishments
for the same act, is the constitutional provision applicable in this case.
5

Hill, 674 P.2d at 97-98.

6

Ross, 951 P.2d at 241-242.

7

State v. Olsen. 289 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah 1930).

8

State v. Sevmour. 163 P. 789, 791-92 (Utah 1917).

9

State v. Llovd. 568 P.2d 356,358 (Utah 1977).

10

State v. Larocco. 794 P.2d 460,462-63 (Utah 1990).
9

become significant when the crimes involved have multiple variations. In this case the
crimes involved, theft by deception, identity fraud, and forgery, have multiple variations.
And so it must be determined whether the greater-lesser relationship actually exists
between the variations of these crimes proved at trial Hill 674 P.2d at 97.
The three subsections below apply the two-tiered test to the charges at issue and
the facts of this case. In the first subsection, the statutory elements of the charges are
compared to show that forgery is a lesser-included offense of both identity fraud and theft
by deception. In the second subsection, the statutory elements are compared to show that
identity fraud is a lesser-included offense of theft by deception. In the third subsection,
the evidence supporting the proven variations of these three crimes is analyzed to show
that the same facts support all three charges. Overall, these arguments demonstrate that
Mr. Chukes should have been convicted of only one crime, theft by deception. The other
two crimes, identity fraud and forgery, are lesser-included offenses and should be
reversed.

A. The Elements of Forgery are Included in Identity Fraud and Theft bv
Deception
Theft by deception should be the only conviction affirmed in this case. That is
because forgery merges into both identity fraud and theft by deception, and identity fraud
merges into theft by deception. This is demonstrated by a comparison of the elements of
the crimes.

10

First, the elements of forgery will be compared with those of identity fraud to
show that forgery is a lesser-included offense of identity fraud. The elements of forgery
are:
(1) intentionally or knowingly;
(2) issuing or uttering a writing;
(3) purporting to be the act of another;
(4) with the purpose to defraud.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (1999). Although this is a complete list of all of the statutory
elements, the trial court added other elements into the jury instructions. Those elements
are that the writing or utterance must not have been the act of the person whose name was
forged. R. 91. Also, the writing or utterance must not have been authorized. Id And, the
defendant must have known that his act was unauthorized. LI
The trial court should not have added these extra elements to the jury instructions.
They do not explain the law under any variation of the crime of forgery,11 nor do they
explain any part of the statutory elements.12 Because of that, their inclusion was error. As
this Court has held, jury instructions "must accurately and adequately inform a criminal
jury as to the basic elements of the crime charged." State v. Larsen. 876 P.2d 391, 396

11

If there are multiple variations of a crime, the jury may be instructed on the variation
most applicable to the case. State v. Roth. 2001 UT 103,1(10; 37 P.3d 1099.
12

See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (1999) (neither the lack of authorization nor the
knowledge of it is mentioned or implied in the statute, with the exception of the "altering a
writing" form of forgery, which is not at issue here).
11

(Utah Ct. App. 1994). What is more, the instructions may not comment on the evidence
or overemphasize any point of the case. State v. Clayton. 6464 P.2d 723, 725 (Utah
1982); Charles E. Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Procedure. § 463 (13th ed. 1992). Here, the
court's extra instructions, particularly those concerning the victim's lack of authorization,
amount to commentary on the evidence and an overemphasis of the fact that Mr. Chukes
did not have Mr. Mewborn's permission to use his information. This is inappropriate. It is
also unnecessary since the lack of authorization is taken into account in the legitimate
forgery instructions. And so, the trial court should not have added the extra instructions.
However, Mr. Chukes does not contest these extra instructions because, even with
them, the forgery elements are fully included in the elements of identity fraud. A person
commits identity fraud when he:
(1) knowingly or intentionally;
(2) obtains personal identifying information of another person;
(3) without that person's authorization;
(4) and the defendant uses, or attempts to use that information with fraudulent
intent, such as to obtain credit, goods, services, or any other thing of value;
(5) and the value of the credit, goods, services, or other thing of value exceeds
$5,000.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-1102 (Supp. 2002); R. 88.
As this comparison of forgery and identity fraud shows, all of the elements of
forgery are included in identity fraud. Both crimes have the same intent element, which is
12

the "knowingly or intentionally" intent. Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-101(1) (1999); Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6-1102(2) (Supp. 2002). Both crimes require that the defendant act with
a purpose to defraud. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501(1) (1999); Utah Code Ann. § 76-61102(2)(b) (Supp. 2002). And, both crimes require the unauthorized use of another's
name, personal identification, or identity. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501(1) (1999); Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6-1102(1) & (2) (Supp. 2002).
In those areas where the elements of the two crimes are not precise matches, the
identity fraud elements are broader and include the elements of forgery. For one thing, the
forgery elements of "making a writing or uttering" that is "purported to be that of
another" is included in the identity fraud statute. These forgery elements are statutorily
described as:
any writing of another [made] without his authority, [or] any such altered
writing; or [the making, completing, executing, authenticating, issuing,
transferring, publishing, or uttering of] any writing so that the writing or the
making, completion, execution, authentication, issuance, transference,
publication or utterance purports to be the act of another, whether the
person is existent or nonexistent, or purports to have been executed at a
time or place or in a numbered sequence other than was in fact the case, or
to be a copy of an original when no such original existed.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (l)(a) & (b) (1999). This is a broad range of activity, but the
identity fraud statute covers it all by simply saying that identity fraud is committed when
the defendant uses, in any way, the personal identifying information of another. Utah
Code Ann. §76-6-1102 (2)(b) (Supp. 2002).
While it is true that the forgery statute indicates that a forger may purport to be

13

either an existent or nonexistent person, and the identity fraud statute deals only with
existent persons, there is still a greater-lesser relationship between these two crimes in
this case. This is because, in this case, the person Mr. Chukes pretended to be was Mr.
Mewborn, not a nonexistent person. Evid. Env. Ex. 1 & 2. And so, under the evidence
proved at trial and the prosecution's theory of this case, R. 173 [141-42], the forgery and
identity fraud statutes are the same.
The analysis above covers all of the elements of forgery. Beyond this, the crime of
identity fraud has a few more elements. For instance, identity fraud requires that the
defendant use another's personal information to obtain or attempt to obtain "credit goods,
services, or any other thing or value

" Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-1102 (2)(b) (Supp.

2002). Also, the value of these items must be more than $5,000 to support a seconddegree felony conviction. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-1102 (3)(d) (Supp. 2002). However,
these elements are inconsequential because, under the greater-lesser test, the greater crime
may have more elements then the lesser crime. It is only the lesser crime that must be
completely immersed in the greater. Ross. 951 P.2d at 241. And that is the case between
the lesser crime of forgery and the greater crime of identity fraud.
Several cases support this. For instance, recently, in State v. Ross, this Court found
that a greater-lesser relationship existed between some variations of forgery and
communications fraud. Ross. 951 P.2d at 241. In that case, this Court pointed out that the
elements of communications fraud were:
(1) devising a scheme or artifice to defraud another;
14

(2) and communicating directly or indirectly with any person for the purpose of
executing or concealing the scheme or artifice;
(3) when the value of the property, money, or thing obtained or sought to be
obtained exceeds $5,000.
Id. at 241-42. These elements, this Court held, include all of the elements of forgery in
some circumstances. Id at 242. Also, in Ross the same act supported both forgery and
communications fraud. IcL at 242-44. And so, the forgery conviction was vacated. Id. at
246.
This case is remarkably similar. The crime of communications fraud, which had a
greater-lesser relationship with forgery in Ross, is similar to the crime of identity fraud in
this case. Both involve the use of deception to obtain goods or services of value. Also,
both punish the activity even if it is simply attempted, but not completed. Further, both
deal with fraudulently obtaining goods or services valued at over $5,000. The only
substantial difference between the crimes of communications fraud and identity fraud is
that identity fraud requires the use of another's personal information, and
communications fraud merely requires communicating to another person to execute or
conceal the fraud. Otherwise, the crimes are identical.
What is more, the crime of identity fraud is actually more like forgery then the
crime of communications fraud. This is because forgery requires the actor to issue or utter
a writing purporting to be that of another, and this inevitably requires the use of another's
personal information. And, that is precisely what is prohibited under the identity fraud
15

statute. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-1102(2) (Supp. 2002). On the other hand, the
communications fraud statute does not address this.
In short, this Court's holding that there is a greater-lesser relationship between
forgery and communications fraud supports the argument that the same relationship exists
between forgery and identity fraud. Most importantly, however, a comparison of the
elements of forgery and identity fraud compel the conclusion that the greater-lesser
relationship exists, and that forgery merges into identity fraud.
Now, turning to the relationship between forgery and theft by deception, a
comparison of the elements of these two crimes shows that there is a greater-lesser
relationship. The elements of forgery are entirely included in theft by deception.
Again, the elements of forgery are:
(1) intentionally or knowingly;
(2) issuing or uttering a writing;
(3) purporting to be the act of another;
(4) with purpose to defraud.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (1999). The non-statutory elements erroneously added by the
trial court are:
(5) the writing or utterance must not have been the act of the person whose name
was forged.
(6) the writing or utterance must not have been authorized.
(7) the defendant must have known that his act was unauthorized.
16

R. 91.
As with identity fraud, these elements, including those erroneously added by the
trial court, are included in theft by deception. The elements of theft by deception are:
(1) intentionally or knowingly;
(2) obtaining or exercising control over the property of another;
(3) by deception
(4) with a purpose to deprive the other of the property;
(5) when the value of the property exceeds $5,000.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405 (1999); R. 80.
As this shows, both forgery and theft by deception share the mental element of
"intentionally or knowingly." Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-101(1) (1999). Also, both crimes
require that the actor have a purpose to obtain something by trickery.13 Where theft by
deception completely swallows forgery, however, is in the "by deception" element. The
"by deception" element covers a wide range of activity, including such acts as: selling a
cubic zirconium as a diamond;14 failing to secure insurance from a licensed company after
13

Specifically, forgery requires the actor to act "with purpose to defraud," Utah Code
Ann. § 76-6-501 (1) (1999), and theft by deception requires the actor to act "with a purpose to
deprive" another of property by deception. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405 (1) (1999). While there
are some slight differences between the definitions of "defraud" and "deceit," those differences
do not affect our comparison of the intent elements here. The principal idea behind these
elements is that the actor act with purpose to obtain something by some form of trickery, and
that brings the forgery statute into the scope of the theft by deception statute.
A full analysis of the subtle differences between "defraud" and deceit" with regard to the
actor's actual actions is found in the subsequent paragraphs.
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State v. Taylor. 884 P.2d 1293, 1296-97 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
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collecting customers' premiums;15 making false representations about real security;16 and
falsely inducing adoptive parents to pay birth-related bills.17 Also, the "by deception"
element of theft-by-deception covers forgery in all its forms.
This is shown by close examination of the "by deception" element. This Court's
opinion in State v. LeFevre provides an excellent description of that element. In that case,
this Court noted that there are three separate components of the "by deception" element.
They are:
(1) that defendant's acts satisfied the statutory definition of deception, (2)
that the deception occurred contemporaneously with the transaction in
question, and (3) that the victim relied upon the deception, at least to some
extent, in parting with property.
State v. LeFevre, 825 P.2d 681, 685 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
These components completely encompass the crime of forgery. In fact, the first
component alone encompasses the crime of forgery even without reference to the other
components. Under the first component, the statutory definitions of "deception" are key.
Here, the jury was given the following four statutory definitions:
(a) [Deception c]reates or confirms by words or conduct an impression of
law or fact that is false and that the actor does not believe to be true and that
is likely to affect the judgment of another in the transaction; or
(b) Fails to correct a false impression of law or fact that is false and that the
actor previously created or confirmed by words or conduct that is likely to
15

State v. Twitchell. 832 P.2d 866, 867 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
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State v. Roberts, 711 P.2d 235, 236-37 (Utah 1985).
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State v. Vigil. 922 P.2d 15, 22-23 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).
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affect the judgment of another and that the actor does not now believe to be
true; or
(c) Prevents another from acquiring information likely to affect his
judgment in the transaction; or . . .
(e) Promises performance that is likely to affect the judgment of another in
the transaction, which performance the actor does not intend to perform or
knows will not be performed; provided, however, that failure to perform the
promise in issue without other evidence of intent or knowledge is not
sufficient proof that the actor did not intend to perform or knew the promise
would not be performed.18
These definitions cover forgery in all its forms. The different forms of forgery
include: altering another's writing; uttering an altered writing; making, completing,
executing, authenticating, issuing, transferring, publishing, or uttering any writing
purporting to be the act of another; or representing any such thing as having been
executed at a different time or place than is the case. None of these acts fall outside the
statutory definitions of deception. This is shown by applying the definitions to the acts of
forgery.
First, forgery fits under "deception" definition (a). This is because the writings or
utterances of forgery create impressions of fact that are false and that the forger knows to
be false. And, such writings or utterances affect any related transactions.19 Second, under
"deception" definition (b), the writings or utterances of forgery create false impressions
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R. 81-82. See also Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-401 (5) (1999) (outlining five statutory
definitions). Subsection (d) of this statute was excluded from the jury instructions here, R. 81,
apparently because it deals with fraudulent sales and it does not apply here.
19

This part of the "deception" definition also takes into account the "purpose to defraud"
element of forgery.
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of fact designed to aid the forger in his purpose to defraud. Specifically, the forgery is
designed to affect the judgment of another. This is because all acts that qualify as
forgeries are done with an attempt to defraud. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501(1) (1999).
Third, forged writings or utterances, by design, prevent others from acquiring correct
information about the writings or utterances. This is because the forged writing or
utterance shrouds the forger's true identity or information, and prevents others from
discovering this information without independent means. And, this likely affects any
related transactions. Finally, forged writings or utterances purport to promise a
performance that the forger does not intend to give. This is because forgery is
characterized by a purpose to defraud. Id.
All in all, forgery is nothing if not deception. The elements of forgery are
completely immersed in the definitions of deception. Also, no form of forgery falls
outside of these definitions. And so, even without reference to the other two components
of the "by deception" element, forgery has a lesser-greater relationship with theft by
deception.
Nonetheless, the other two components of the "by deception" element encompass
forgery. Under the second component of theft by deception, the deception must occur
contemporaneously with the transaction at issue. LeFevre, 825 P.2d at 685. Forgery fits in
easily here. Forgery, a form of deception, is always done with a purpose to defraud. Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6-501(1) (1999). So any writing or utterance is, of necessity, aimed at
affecting any related transactions. Of course, it may be true that forgery occurs some time
20

before the related transaction. But this does not mean that the deception and transaction
are not contemporaneous. This Court has already decided that. LeFevre, 825 P.2d at 686.
As long as the affected party is being deceived at the time of the transaction, the
deception and transaction are considered contemporaneous. Id. In this way, every case of
forgery would fall within the contemporaneous component because a forger always acts
to deceive someone during a transaction. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501(1) (1999). So, the
second component of the "by deception" element encompasses forgery.
The third component of the "by deception" element offers the most compelling
reason for finding that forgery is a lesser-included offense of theft by deception. Under
that component, the victim must rely, at least to some extent, on a deception in parting
with goods or services. Furthermore, both this Court and the Utah Supreme Court have
recognized that this component includes the means of deception, as well as the actual
deception:
[i]t is clear from the face of the [theft-by-deception] statute that reliance by
the victim is an element of the crime of theft by deception. In context,
obtaining property "by deception " can only mean "by means of
deception. " Deception, followed by transfer of property to the deceiver,
does not add up to theft by deception without the causal element of
reliance.20
In addition to this, this Court has explained that the reliance component of the "by
deception" element focuses upon the effectiveness of the actual means used to deceive:
The deceit must be "material" to constitute the offense, in the sense that it
20

LeFevre, 825 P.2d at 686-87 (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Jones. 657 P.2d 1263,
1267 (Utah 1982)).
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must be a significant factor in the transaction . . . . Materiality seems to
require that the victim to some extent must believe the pretense to be true,
but the greater focus is the objective issue of whether the misrepresentation
was instrumental in effecting transfer of [property],
14 at 687.
Because of this, forgery cannot help but fall completely within the third
component of the "by deception" element. Forgery is the deliberate issuance of a writing
or uttering that purports to be that of another. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (1) (1999). It is
done without the other's authorization, R. 91, and it is done with a purpose to defraud.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (1) (1999). It is, precisely, a material means of deceit.
Indeed, it is so effective a means of deceit that criminal code writers have continually
maintained that it constitutes a crime in itself, even if the objective of fraudulently
obtaining property is not realized.21 In these circumstances, forgery must be considered a
21

The Utah Supreme Court has noted that, even though the theft and fraud statutes may
be perfected to the point that forgery decreases in importance, it is still criminalized because of
its strong capacity to create confusion:
The drafters of the Model Penal code suggest that forgery arose as a separate
branch of criminal law due to the shortcomings of other penal provisions. The
drafters suggest that if these shortcomings are remedied in the area of fraud,
attempt, complicity, and professional criminality, the need for a separate forgery
offense is diminished. Nevertheless, forgery is "retained as a separate offense in
the Model Code, in part because the concept is so embeded in statute and popular
understanding that legislative abolition seems unlikely. Moreover, the special
danger of forgery as a threat to public confidence in important symbols of
commerce and as a means of perpetrating large-scale fraud is worth recognition.
There is also the point that the offense of forgery should be drafted to redress
injuries beyond those that would be occasioned by conduct amounting to theft.
Whether for these reasons or others, in any event, the judgment to retain forgery
as a separate offense has been universally accepted in modern criminal codes."
State v. Frampton. 737 P.2d 183,195 n.59 (Utah 1987) (quoting Model Penal Code § 224.1
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lesser-included offense of theft by deception.
This conclusion is further supported by the legal definitions of "deceit" found in
authorities such as Black's Law Dictionary, A Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage, and
persuasive case law. To begin with, Black's Law Dictionary says that deceit is "[t]he act
of intentionally giving a false impression

" Black's Law Dictionary 413 (7th ed.

1999). It is also "fraudulent misrepresentation," and, according to
A Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage, it is "fraud" in some senses of that word. A
Dictionary of Modem Legal Usage 251 (2nd ed. 1995). "Fraudulent misrepresentation" is
"[a] false statement that is known to be false . . . that is intended to induce a party to
detrimentally rely on it." Black's Law Dictionarv 1016 (7th ed. 1999). "Fraud" has a
number of meanings, but its primary meaning, and the one most applicable here, is "[a]
knowing misrepresentation of the truth or concealment of a material fact to induce
another to act to his or her detriment." Id at 670.
All of these definitions encompass forgery. Indeed, these definitions specifically
focus on the means of deceit as well as the state of being deceived. And forgery is a
means of deceit. The forgery elements themselves, knowingly or intentionally making or
uttering a writing, purporting to be the act of another, without the other's authorization,
are all included in the primary definition of "deceit." And, while the element of acting
"with a purpose to defraud" arguably falls outside of the general definition of deceit, this

comment 2, at 284).
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element is encompassed by the "purpose to deprive another of property" element of theft
by deception. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405(1) (1999). So, forgery is completely included
in theft by deception.
Also, persuasive case law supports that forgery is a lesser-included offense of theft
by deception. Most significantly, the Utah Supreme Court has already recognized that
forgery is one step below theft. In State v. Frampton the Court noted that, under the
Model Penal Code, forgery is actually treated as theft by deception when large amounts
of money are involved:
The offense [of forgery] is graded as a misdemeanor [under the Model
Penal Code], although use of such a forgery in a scheme to defraud may
well be treated as a felony under Section 223.3 [theft by deception] where
significant amounts of money are involved.
Frampton. 737 P.2d at 195. Further, the Court strongly implied that this makes forgery a
lesser-included offense of crimes such as theft by deception:
"The most serious instances of forgery will occur in connection with efforts
to defraud, and it seems clear that a modern forgery provision should be
drafted to avoid the imposition of penalties disproportionate to those
authorized for fraud."22
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Id at 196 (quoting the Model Penal Code). Frampton includes a short history of
forgery and some interesting notations. For instance, the opinion indicates that forgery originally
arose because of the shortcomings of the fraud, attempt, complicity, and professional criminality
provisions. IdL at 195 n.59. And, even though those provisions and the theft provisions have been
vastly improved, the forgery provisions remain to redress those wrongs that are beyond the scope
of the theft statutes. Id.
Of course, in Frampton the Utah Supreme Court was not examining the forgery and theft
laws in connection with a merger issue. It was examining them in connection with an offensegrading issue. Id. at 194-96. However, the research and holdings center around the relationship
between forgery, fraud, and theft, and they are applicable here.
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This supports that the crime of theft by deception inherently includes the crime of
forgery, and that they have a greater-lesser relationship as a matter of law.
Other jurisdictions have already recognized this greater-lesser relationship. The
Kansas Court of Appeals has specifically found that, under its statutes, forgery is a lesserincluded offense of theft-by-deception in some circumstances.23 Additionally, the
Washington Supreme Court,24 Ohio Court of Appeals,25 and Alabama Court of Criminal
Appeals26 have found that forgery is a lesser-included offense of theft when the same
facts support both charges. Beyond this, other courts, in different contexts, have noted
the close relationship between forgery and theft.27 Because of this, and the fact that the
Utah theft by deception statute entirely encompass forgery, forgery is a lesser-included
offense of theft by deception.
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State v. Perrv. 823 P.2d 804, 808 (Kan. Ct. App. 1991). The elements of forgery and
theft by deception in Kansas are largely similar to the elements of these crimes in Utah. Id. at
807. However, the Kansas forgery statute requires proof that the perpetrator deliver a "written
instrument which he knew had been forged" to the victim. Id. at 808. Because of this, the Kansas
court found that forgery was not inevitably a lesser-included offense of theft-by-deception. But it
was under the facts of that case. IdL
The Utah statute does not have a delivery element. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501
(1999) (lacking delivery as an essential element).
24

State v. Scobv. 810P.2d 1358, 1361 (Wash. 1991).
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State v. Wolfe, 462 N.E.2d 455,457 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983).

26

Aucoinv. State. 548 So.2d 1053, 1058 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989).
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See State v. Gotti. 43 P.3d 812, 814-16 (Kan. 2002) (differentiating between forgery,
theft by deception, and making a false writing requires close analysis); Com, v. Alexander. 722
A.2d 698,700 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998) (in the area of forgery and theft by deception, the legislature
may make specific directives concerning culpability for one or more counts).
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To sum up, forgery is a lesser-included offense of both identity fraud
and theft by deception. Accordingly, the jury should have been instructed they that could
not convict Mr. Chukes of forgery unless they found him not-guilty of identity fraud and
theft by deception. However, the jury was not given this instruction. Because of this, the
forgery conviction should be vacated.

B. The Elements of Identity Fraud are Included in Theft by Deception
The identity fraud conviction, like the forgery conviction, should be vacated
because identity fraud is a lesser-included offense of thefl by deception. This is
demonstrated by a comparison of the identity fraud and theft by deception elements.
First, the elements of identity fraud are:
(1) knowingly or intentionally;
(2) obtaining personal identifying information of another;
(3) without the other's authorization;
(4) and using or attempting to use that information,
(5) with fraudulent intent, including obtaining or attempting to obtain credit,
goods, services, or any other thing of value;
(6) and the thing of value is or exceeds $5,000.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-1102 (Supp. 2002); R. 88. All of these elements are encompassed
by the crime of theft-by-deception. Theft by deception is committed when a person:
(1) knowingly or intentionally;
26

(2) obtains or exercises control over property of another;
(3) by deception;
(4) with a purpose to deprive the other of property;
(5) and the value of the property is or exceeds $5,000.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405 (1999).
This comparison shows that some of the elements of the two crimes are identical.
In particular, both crimes have the same mental intent of "knowingly or intentionally/'
and both involve the objective of obtaining something worth $5,000 or more. Other than
that, the elements of the two crimes are different. However, those elements of identity
fraud that aren't identical to theft by deception are fully encompassed by theft by
deception. And that is the hallmark of a greater-lesser relationship.
To begin with, the identity fraud elements of "obtaining personal identifying
information of another, without the other's authorization" are encompassed by the "by
deception" element of theft by deceiving. This is because the use of another's personal
identifying information without their authorization is a means of deceiving another
person.
As has already been shown above, the "by deception" element consists of three
separate components: the statutory definition of deception, the contemporaneousness of
the deception and the transaction at issue, and the victim's reliance upon the deception in
parting with property. LeFevre. 825 P.2d at 685.
First, the identity fraud elements of "obtaining personal identifying information of
27

another, without the other's authorization" constitute deception under the first statutory
definition of deception. This is because the identity fraud elements do precisely what is
proscribed in the first "deception" definition: they "create or confirm" an impression of
fact "that is false and that the actor does not believe to be true and that is likely to affect
the judgment of another in the transaction." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-401 (5) (1999); R.
81. Indeed, creating a false impression of fact is precisely the point of using another's
personal information to defraud. It is one of the many ways of deceiving another person
to obtain services, goods, or something else of value. Therefore, the identity fraud
elements of "obtaining personal identifying information of another, without the other's
authorization" are encompassed in the first definition of "deception."
The identity fraud elements of "obtaining personal identifying information of
another, without the other's authorization" also fit under the other three statutory
definitions of "deception" that were given to the jury.28 The identity fraud elements fit
under the second definition of "deception" because using another's personal information
without his authorization is creating "a false impression of... fact," as proscribed by the
second definition. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-40 l(5)(b) (1999). Also, as proscribed by the
second definition, this false impression is not corrected because it is always created with
the intention of gaining something of value.29 Further, when one person uses another's
28

See R. 80-81 (listing the statutory definitions of "deception" given to the jury).

29

One of the elements of identity fraud is that the information must be used, or attempted
to be used, to obtain something of value. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-1102(2)(b) (Supp. 2002).
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identifying information, any related transactions are likely to be affected. So, the identity
fraud elements of "obtaining personal identifying information of another, without the
other's authorization" are encompassed by the second definition of "deception."
These identity fraud elements are also encompassed by the third definition of
"deception." This is because the use of another's personal identifying information,
without their permission, prevents the truth from coming to light. And, as proscribed by
the third definition of "deception," this is likely to affect the outcome of related
transactions. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-401(5) (c) (1999).
Finally, the identity fraud elements of "obtaining personal identifying information
of another, without the other's authorization" are included within the fourth definition of
"deception." This is because the use of another's identifying information in a transaction
involves making promises which the maker does not intend to keep. And this, of course,
affects the judgment of others involved in the transaction, as proscribed by the fourth
definition of "deception." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-40 l(5)(e) (1999).
In short, the identity fraud elements of "obtaining personal identifying information
of another, without the other's authorization" are completely included in the first
component of the "by deception" element of theft by deception.
The second component of the "by deception" element, contemporaneousness of
the deception and transaction, also encompasses the identity fraud elements of "obtaining
personal identifying information of another, without the other's authorization." This is
because the perpetrator's purpose is to use the identifying information to deceive another
29

during a transaction. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-1102(2)(b) (1999). And so the perpetrator
must use the identifying information in a way that will enable him to obtain something of
value. Put differently, the person who is being scammed must believe that the perpetrator
is the person he purports to be, or else the scam will not work. And for that to happen, the
perpetrator must obtain another's personal information and use it, or attempt to use it, in a
way that will cause the victim to believe the perpetrator. This requires
contemporaneousness of the deception and transaction. So, the second component of the
"by deception" element completely encompasses the identity fraud elements of
"obtaining personal identifying information of another, without the other's authorization."
The third component of the "by deception" element focuses on the fact that the
victim must rely on the perpetrator's deception in parting with goods or services. The
component includes the means of deception as well as the actual reliance. LeFevre, 825
P.2d at 686-87 (citing State v. Jones. 657 P.2d 1263,1267 (Utah 1982)). Because of this
focus on the means of deception, "obtaining personal identifying information of another,
without the other's authorization" falls completely under the third component. Using
personal information without authorization is, doubtless, a means of deception designed
to cause detrimental reliance. In fact, the very name of the crime "identity fraud" shows
that the crime is a means of deceit covered by the theft by deception statute.
Because of this, identity fraud is a lesser-included offense of theft by deception in
the same way that forgery is a lesser-included offense of theft by deception.
Fundamentally, identity fraud and forgery are both means of deception, and these crimes
30

are punishable even if the actual taking was not accomplished. This is because the means,
forgery and identity fraud, are deemed so dishonest and potentially disruptive to our
society that it warrants punishment whether it is successful or not.30 It follows, then, that a
conviction under the forgery statute or identity fraud statute is completely appropriate
when the taking was not actually accomplished. However, when the taking is
accomplished, the crime becomes theft by deception.
In short, the crime of identity fraud, particularly the elements of "obtaining
another's personal identifying information, without authorization," is encompassed by the
"by deception" element of theft by deception.
The only remaining elements of identity fraud not accounted for are "using" the
personal information of another "with fraudulent intent, including [obtaining or
attempting] to obtain credit, goods, services, or any other thing of value." Utah Code
Ann. § 76-6-1102 (2)(b) (Supp. 2002). However, these elements are included in the theft
by deception element of deceiving another "with a purpose to deprive [the other of
property.]" Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405(1) (1999). Indeed, the theft by deception element
of deceiving another "with a purpose to deprive [the other of property]" is much broader
than the identity fraud elements. With theft by deception, it must be proven that the
defendant actually did obtain property or exercise control over it. On the other hand,
30

Neither the forgery nor the identity fraud statutes require that something of value
actually be taken. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (1999) (the element of taking something of
value, or some similar element, does not appear in the forgery statute); Utah Code Ann. § 76-61102 (Supp. 2002) (perpetrator is punished for either using or attempting to use personal
information of another to gain something of value).
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identity fraud requires only that the defendant attempt to obtain something of value. Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6-1102 (2)(b) (Supp. 2002). This shows that theft by deception not only
encompasses identity fraud, it reaches beyond it. This is one of the hallmarks of the
greater-lesser relationship, and it shows that this relationship exists between identity fraud
and theft by deception.
In sum, identity fraud is a lesser-included offense of theft by deception as a matter
of law. And, Mr. Chukes should not have been convicted of both crimes. Only his theft
by deception conviction should remain standing.
The greater-lesser relationships between forgery and identity fraud, forgery and
theft by deception, and identity fraud and theft by deception are not the only reasons to
vacate the forgery and identity fraud convictions. An equally compelling reason is that all
three crimes are supported by the same evidence. Indeed, only one criminal act was
committed. Because of that, only one count of the conviction, theft by deception, should
stand. That argument is fully explored in the following subsection.

C. The Evidence Supporting Forgery, Identity Fraud, and Theft bv
Deception is the Same
Under section 76-1-402 of the Utah Code, the second tier of the lesser-included
offense analysis focuses on the facts proved at trial. Hill, 674 P.2d at 97. Specifically, if
the crimes at issue have multiple variations, it must be determined whether the greaterlesser relationship actually exists between the variations of the crimes proved at trial. IdL
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This tier of the lesser-included offense analysis evolved through a combination of
constitutional interpretation and common law. Id However, it is also specified in section
76-1-402. Under subsection (1) of 76-1-402, a defendant may not be punished multiple
times for the same act:
when the same act of a defendant under a single criminal episode shall
establish offenses which may be punished in different ways under different
provisions of this code, the act shall be punishable under only one such
provision; an acquittal or conviction and sentence under any such provision
bars a prosecution under any other such provision.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(1) (1999). Accordingly, if the same evidence supports a
defendant's convictions, only one of the convictions may be affirmed.
In this case, the crimes of forgery and identity fraud have multiple variations31 and
they are supported by the same facts that support theft by deception. A review of the
evidence shows this.
The evidence supporting each element of theft by deception will be examined first
31

The variations of forgery are: altering any writing of another without his authority;
uttering any such altered writing; making, completing, executing, authenticating, issuing,
transferring, publishing, or uttering any writing so that it purports to be that of another; or
purporting to have executed something at a time or place or in a different sequence than was
really the case; or representing something to be a copy of something which does not exist. Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6-501(1) (1999).
The variations of identity fraud are: obtaining the name or address or telephone number
or driver's license number or social security number or place of employment or employee
identification numbers or mother's maiden name or electronic identification numbers or digital
signatures or any other personal information of another without the other's authorization, and
using it with fraudulent intent. Alternatively, identity fraud is committed when someone attempts
to use any of the above information with fraudulent intent. Additionally, the value of the targeted
thing of value affects the degree of punishment associated for the crime. For instance, if the
thing's value is or exceeds $5,000, identity fraud is a second-degree felony. Utah Code Ann. §
76-6-1102 (Supp. 2002).
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because theft by deception is the encompassing crime in this case. The first element of
theft by deception is the mental intent of "knowingly or intentionally" committing the
crime. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405 (1) (1999); R. 80. That intent is implied by the facts
supporting the other elements. The second element is the act of "obtaining] or
exercis[ing] control over the property of another

" Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405 (1)

(1999); R. 80. This is proven. On March 1, 2001, Mr. Chukes went to Crown Bedrooms
in Murray, selected some bedroom furniture, applied for credit, and then came back later
with a U-Haul to take the furniture away. R. 173 [37-38; 138]. Then he, along with
others, loaded the furniture in the truck. Id. Finally, he drove away with the furniture and
did not return it. Id This shows that he obtained and exercised control over the property
of Crown Bedrooms.
The third element of theft by deception is that the property must have been taken
by means of deception. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405 (1) (1999); R. 80. Mr. Chukes did
this by pretending to be Mr. Mewbom. He used Mr. Mewborn's name, birthday, social
security number, and driver's license. R. 173 [138]; Evid. Env. Ex. 2. He signed Mr.
Mewborn's name to three documents necessary to obtain the furniture. The first
document was the credit application, Evid. Env. Ex. 2, the second was the credit contract,
Evid. Env. Ex. 1, and the third was the receipt for the furniture. Evid. Env. Ex. 3. And, he
did all of this without authorization from Mr. Mewborn. Further, he did this with the
intent to defraud. R. 173 [71-72].
Notably, all of this was necessary to complete the deception. Without obtaining
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Mr. Mewborn's personal information, Mr. Chukes could not have pretended to be Mr.
Mewborn when he applied for credit at the store. And, without filling out and signing the
credit application, credit contract, and furniture receipt, Mr. Grimshaw would not have
permitted Mr. Chukes to take the furniture.32 Finally, if he had done all of this with Mr.
Mewborn's authorization, there would have been no deception. And so, all of this
evidence is necessary to support the "by deception" element.
The fourth element of theft by deception is that Mr. Chukes must have acted with a
purpose to deprive Crown Bedrooms of the bedroom furniture. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6405 (1) (1999); R. 80. This is shown by the fact that Mr. Chukes came to get the furniture
and took it away in a U-Haul. R. 173 [37-38,139]. He did not return it or pay for it. IcL
This proves an intent to permanently deprive Crown Bedrooms of the furniture.
The final element is that the furniture must have exceeded $5,000. This is proven
by the credit contract and the furniture receipt, which both show the furniture cost
$5,955.39. Evid. Env. Ex. 1 & 3.
The most important thing to note about this evidence is that the facts supporting
the "by deception" element are the same as those supporting the identity fraud and
forgery counts. Indeed, the prosecutor himself explained that Mr. Chukes' use of Mr.
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See IcL at 24-28; 30; Evid. Env. Ex. 1,2, & 3 (Crown Bedroom's procedure for
obtainingfinancingrequires the applicant to fill out an application with information such as his
name, social security number, home phone number, driver's license number, address, previous
address, present employer, position, income, mortgage information, and a reference telephone
number. Then all of this is faxed in to American General, where a credit check is conducted. If
the application is accepted, the store requires the customer to sign a credit contract, and receipt
for furniture).
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Mewborn's personal information, and the forgery of his name and information, supports
the "by deception" element of theft by deception:
the deception at issue in this case is the fact that the defendant represented
himself as somebody he wasn't. He said he was Jeffrey Mewborn; he's not.
He used Jeffrey Mewborn's name, he signed Jeffrey Mewborn's name, he
used his identifying information like his birthday, Social Security card
number and previous address when applying for the credit card. So that was
the deception involved.
R. 173 [138]. There is not anything about the identity fraud and forgery counts that
reaches beyond this theft by deception evidence. All three counts are supported by Mr.
Chukes' act of pretending to be someone else, on March 1, 2001, at the Crown Bedrooms
store in Murray. R. 137 [137-142].
This is further supported by reviewing the prosecutor's arguments regarding the
identity fraud and forgery counts. With regard to identity fraud, the prosecutor explained
that this crime is supported by the fact that Mr. Chukes used Mr. Mewborn's name, birth
date, social security number, and Georgia address in applying for credit at Crown
Bedrooms. Id at 139-40. This was done with the intent of obtaining the furniture, which
is a thing of value worth more than $5,000. Id. at 140. Additionally, it was also done
without the authorization of Mr. Mewborn. Id.
Ail of this, with the exception of the fact that the furniture was worth more than
$5,000, is nothing more than the act of deception supporting the theft by deception
charge. What is more, the furniture value does not differentiate the identity fraud facts
from the theft by deception facts. This is because second-degree felony theft by
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deception, like second-degree identity fraud, requires a property worth of $5,000 or more.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412 (l)(a)(i) (1999). And so, identity fraud is factually
encompassed by theft by deception in this case.
Now, it is true that Mr. Chukes' lack of authorization to use Mr. Mewborn's
personal information was not specifically mentioned by the prosecutor in his summary of
the evidence supporting theft by deception, R. 173 [137-39], but this lack of authorization
was, nonetheless, necessary for the deception to work. If Mr. Mewborn had authorized
the use of his information, there would have been no deception. Likewise, if Mr. Chukes
did not know that Mr. Mewborn had not authorized the use of his information, there
would have been no deception. The lack of authorization is a crucial part of the deception,
and so it necessarily supports the theft by deception charge. The bottom line is that
identity fraud is supported by exactly the same facts as theft by deception, and so the
identity fraud conviction should be vacated.
The same is true of the forgery charge. All of the evidence supporting the forgery
charge supports the theft by deception charge. As the prosecutor explained, the evidence
supporting the forgery charge is that Mr. Chukes filled out the credit application using
Mr. Mewborn's personal information. R. 173 [141]. Then he signed the credit application
using Mr. Mewborn's name. Id He also signed the credit contract and the receipt for the
furniture. Id. Further, these acts were not authorized by Mr. Mewborn, and Mr. Chukes
knew that they were not authorized. Id at 142. Finally, Mr. Chukes acted with the
purpose to defraud. That is, he acted with the purpose of obtaining the furniture without
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paying for it. Id
There is nothing here that is not necessary to support the deception element of
theft by deception. As with identity fraud, the only fact here that was not specifically
mentioned by the prosecutor in his summary of support for the theft by deception charge
is the fact that there was no authorization for the forgery. However, as explained above,
this lack of authorization was necessary for the deception to exist. And so, as with
identity fraud, forgery is a lesser-included offense of theft by deception as a matter of fact
in this case, and both the forgery and identity fraud convictions should be vacated.
In sum, there are no independent facts to support forgery and identity fraud. Every
fact supporting these charges is necessary to support the theft by deceiving charge.
Without independent support, the forgery and identity fraud convictions fail, and should
be vacated.

CONCLUSION
In light of the above, Mr. Chukes respectfully requests that this court vacate his
convictions for forgery and identity fraud. Alternatively, Mr. Chukes requests that this
court vacate his conviction for forgery.
SUBMITTED this

jj^

day of October, 2002.
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ADDENDUM A

S\v) £
THIRD DISTRICT COURT SALT LAKE COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
INCOURT NOTE
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs

Case No: 011913062 FS

KEVIN MAURICE CHUKES,
Defendant.
Custody: Salt Lake County Jail

Judge:
Date:

ANN BOYDEN
April 10, 2002

PRESENT
Clerk:
terryb
Prosecutor: JOEY NATALE
Defendant
D e f e n d a n t ' s A t t o r n e y ( s ) : JOHN OCONNELL, JR.
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of b i r t h : May 1 5 ,
Tape Number:
video

1964
Tape C o u n t :

2.31

CHARGES

1. THEFT BY DECEPTION - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 01/30/2002 Guilty
2. IDENTITY FRAUD - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 01/30/2002 Guilty
3. FORGERY - 3rd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 01/30/2002 Guilty
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT BY DECEPTION a 2nd
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah
State Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of IDENTITY FRAUD a 2nd Degree
Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not
less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State
Prison.
Page 1
I-1-1

Case No: 011913062
Date:
Apr 10, 2002

Based on the defendant's conviction of FORGERY a 3rd Degree Felony,
the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to
exceed five years in the Utah State Prison.
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the
defendant will be confined.
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT /CONSECUTIVE NOTE
Prison time to run concurrent to each charge, but consecutive to
sentence in Idaho.
SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE
Commitment to begin forthwith.

Charge # 1
Charge # 2

Fine:
Suspended:
Surcharge:
Due:

$10000.00
$0.00
$4594.59
$10000.00

Charge # 3
Total Fine:
Total Suspended:
Total Surcharge:
Total Principal Due:

$10000.00
$0
$4594.59
$10000.00
Plus Interest

Page 2

r*v*

Case No: 011913062
Date:
Apr 10, 2002
SENTENCE FINE PAYMENT NOTE
C/O defendant to pay '$500.00 recoupment fees and $$5,935.36
restitution. Fines and restitution to be handled through Board of

Page 3 (last)
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ADDENDUM B

76-1-402

UTAH CRIMINAL CODE

of a drunk driving charge under § 41-6-44 after
the defendant has pleaded guilty to driving
without a license, without a registration certificate and without a safety sticker, since the
citations charge separate offenses entirely unrelated to each other. Hupp v. Johnson, 606 P.2d
253 (Utah 1980).
Cited in State v. O'Brien, 721 P2d 896 (Utah

1986); State v. Larocco, 742 R2d 89 (Utah Ct.
App. 1987); State v. McGrath, 749 P.2d 631
(Utah 1988); State v. Thompson, 751 P.2d 805
(Utah Ct. App. 1988); State v. Ortega, 751 P.2d
1138 (Utah 1988); State v. Johnson, 784 P.2d
1135 (Utah 1989); State v. Lopez, 789 P2d 39
(Utah Ct. App. 1990); State v. Scales, 946 P.2d
377 (Utah C t A

™'

1997)

'

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law
§ 20.

C.J.S. — 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 14.

76-1-402. Separate offenses arising out of single criminal
episode — Included offenses.
(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal action for all
separate offenses arising out of a single criminal episode; however, when the
same act of a defendant under a single criminal episode shall establish offenses
which may be punished in different ways under different provisions of this
code, the act shall be punishable under only one such provision; an acquittal or
conviction and sentence under any such provision bars a prosecution under
any other such provision.
(2) Whenever conduct may establish separate offenses under a single
criminal episode, unless the court otherwise orders to promote justice, a
defendant shall not be subject to separate trials for multiple offenses when:
(a) The offenses are within the jurisdiction of a single court; and
(b) The offenses are known to the prosecuting attorney at the time the
defendant is arraigned on the first information or indictment.
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the offense
charged but may not be convicted of both the offense charged and the included
offense. An offense is so included when:
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts
required to establish the commission of the offense charged; or
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form of preparation to commit the offense charged or an offense otherwise included
therein; or
(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as a lesser included offense.
(4) The court shall not be obligated to charge the jury with respect to an
included offense unless there is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the
defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the included offense.
(5) If the district court on motion after verdict or judgment, or an appellate
court on appeal or certiorari, shall determine that there is insufficient evidence
to support a conviction for the offense charged but that there is sufficient
evidence to support a conviction for an included offense and the trier of fact
necessarily found every fact required for conviction of that included offense,
the verdict or judgment of conviction may be set aside or reversed and a
judgment of conviction entered for the included offense, without necessity of a
new trial, if such relief is sought by the defendant.
History: C. 1953, 76-1-402, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-1-402; 1974, ch. 32, § 2.

Cross-References. — Computer Crimes Act
not to bar prosecution for conduct also violating
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ADDENDUM C

76-6-1002

UTAH CRIMINAL CODE

PART 10
MAIL BOX DAMAGE AND MAIL THEFT
76-6-1002. Damage to mail receptacle — Penalties Greater offenses.
(1) A person commits the crime of damage to a mail receptacle if the person
knowingly damages the condition of a mail receptacle, including:
(a) taking, concealing, damaging, or destroying a key; or
(b) breaking open, tearing down, taking, damaging, or destroying a mail
receptacle.
(2) (a) In determining the degree of an offense committed under Subsection
(1), the penalty levels in Subsection 76-6-106(3)(b) apply.
(b) If the act committed amounts to an offense subject to a greater
penalty, this subsection does not prohibit prosecution and sentencing for
the more serious offense.
History: C. 1953, 76-6-1002, enacted by L.
1998, ch. 87, § 2; 2002, ch. 166, § 7.
Amendment Notes. — The 2002 amend-

ment, effective May 6, 2002, updated the statutory reference in Subsection (2)(a).

PART 11
IDENTITY FRAUD ACT
76-6-1101. Identity fraud.
This part is known as the "Identity Fraud Act."
History: C. 1953, 76-6-1101, enacted by L.
2000, ch. 57, § 4.
Effective Dates. — Laws 2000, ch. 57 be-

came effective on May 1, 2000, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

76-6-1102. Identity fraud crime.
(1) For purposes of this part, "personal identifying information" may include:
(a) name;
(b) address;
(c) telephone number;
(d) driver's license number;
(e) Social Security number;
(f) place of employment;
(g) employee identification numbers or other personal identification
numbers;
(h) mother's maiden name;
(i) electronic identification numbers;
(j) digital signatures or a private key; or
(k) any other numbers or information that can be used to access a
person's financial resources or medical information in the name of another
person without the consent of that person except for numbers or information that can be prosecuted as financial transaction card offenses under
Sections 76-6-506 through 76-6-506.4.
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76-6-1103

(2) A person is guilty of identity fraud when that person knowingly or
intentionally:
(a) obtains personal identifying information of another person without
the authorization of that person; and
(b) uses, or attempts to use, that information with fraudulent intent,
including to obtain, or attempt to obtain, credit, goods, services, any other
thing of value, or medical information in the name of another person
without the consent of that person.
(3) Identity fraud is:
(a) a class B misdemeanor if the value of the credit, goods, services, or
any other thing of value is less than $300;
(b) a class A misdemeanor if:
(i) a value cannot be determined and the personal identifying
information has been used without the consent of that person to
obtain medical information or to obtain employment; or
(ii) the value of the credit, goods, services, or any other thing of
value is or exceeds $300 but is less than $1,000;
(c) a third degree felony if the value of the credit, goods, services, or any
other thing of value is or exceeds $1,000 but is less than $5,000; or
(d) a second degree felony if the value of the credit, goods, services, or
any other thing of value is or exceeds $5,000.
(4) Multiple violations within a 90-day period may be aggregated into a
single offense, and the degree of the offense is determined by the total value of
all credit, goods, services, or any other thing of value used, or attempted to be
used, through the multiple violations.
History: C. 1953, 76-6-1102, enacted by L.
2000, ch. 57, § 5; 2002, ch. 122, § 3.
Amendment Notes. — The 2002 amendment, effective May 6, 2002, added "or to obtain
employment" in Subsection (3)(b)(i) and made a
stylistic change.

Effective Dates. — Laws 2000, ch. 57 became effective on May 1, 2000, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

76-6-1103. Investigation, jurisdiction,, and prima facie
evidence of violation.
(1) In any criminal proceeding brought pursuant to this section, the crime
shall be considered to have been committed in any county in which any part of
the identity fraud took place, regardless of whether the defendant was ever
actually in that county
(2) In addition to investigations conducted by law enforcement agencies, the
Division of Consumer Protection also has responsibility for investigating
violations of this part where identity fraud is the primary violation that is
alleged to have been committed.
(3) A criminal conviction under this part is prima facie evidence of a
violation of Section 13-11-4, of the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act.
(4) Any violation of this part constitutes a violation of Section 13-11-4, of the
Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act.
History: C. 1953, 76-6-1103, enacted by L.
2000, ch. 57, § 6; 2002, ch. 122, § 4.
Amendment Notes. — The 2002 amendf ^ e f J e c t ? v e M a v 6> 2 0 0 2 » i n Subsection (2)
aaaed the beginning of the sentence ending
with agencies" and added the ending of the
sentence beginning with "where identity
fraud."

Effective Dates. — Laws 2000, ch. 57 became effective on May 1. 2000, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.
Cross-References. — Division of Consumer
p r o t e c t ion, Title 13, Chapter 2.
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76-6-413

UTAH CRIMINAL CODE

474 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), cert, denied, 843 P.2d
516 (Utah 1992).
Cited in State v. Slowe, 728 P.2d 110 (Utah
^
,
-A* n o j n , c / T u u n .
985); State
v. Pr>
Parkin,
715 (Utah
Ct.
, n 742
4 RR2d
h
^KtT 1987); L
f J kv.
^Deitman,
L !d ™
c
App.
State
739 ^P.2dc ?616
-.nor,

(Utah 1987); State v. Branch, 743 P.2d 1187
(Utah 1987); State v. Barher, 747 P.2d 436
(Utah Ct. App. 1987); State v. Hunter, 831 P.2d
1 0 3 3

<Utah

C t

' APP'

1992)

>

S t a t e

V

" D ° v i s > 965

P-2d 525 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 50 Am. Jur. 2d Larceny § 49.
C.J.S. — 52A C.J.S. Larceny § 60(1).

76-6-413. Release of fur-bearing animals — Penalty —
Finding.
(1) In any case not amounting to a felony of the second degree, any person
who intentionally and without permission of the owner releases any furbearing animal raised for commercial purposes is guilty of a felony of the third
degree.
(2) The Legislature finds that the release of fur-bearing animals raised for
commercial purposes subjects the animals to unnecessary suffering through
deprivation of food and shelter and compromises their genetic integrity,
thereby permanently depriving the owner of substantial value.
History: C. 1953, 76-6-413, enacted by L.
1997, ch. 119, § 2.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1997, ch. 119 be-

came effective on May 5, 1997, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

PART 5
FRAUD
76-6-501. Forgery — "Writing" defined.
(1) A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to defraud anyone, or with
knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone, he:
(a) alters any writing of another without his authority or utters any
such altered writing; or
(b) makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues, transfers, publishes, or utters any writing so that the writing or the making, completion,
execution, authentication, issuance, transference, publication or utterance
purports to be the act of another, whether the person is existent or
nonexistent, or purports to have been executed at a time or place or in a
numbered sequence other than was in fact the case, or to be a copy of an
original when no such original existed.
(2) As used in this section, "writing" includes printing, electronic storage or
transmission, or any other method of recording valuable information including
forms such as:
(a) checks, tokens, stamps, seals, credit cards, badges, trademarks,
money, and any other symbols of value, right, privilege, or identification;
(b) a security, revenue stamp, or any other instrument or writing issued
by a government or any agency; or
260
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76-6-501

(c) a check, an issue of stocks, bonds, or any other instrument or writing
representing an interest in or claim against property, or a pecuniary
interest m or claim against any person or enterprise
(3) Forgery is a felony of the third degree
History: C. 1953, 76-6-501, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, * 76-6-501; 1974, ch. 32, * 19;
1975, ch. 52, § 1; 1995, ch. 291, * 15; 1996,
ch. 205, * 27.
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amend
ment, effective May 1, 1995, incorporated
former Subsection (3), which had set out the
elements of second degree forgery, into Subsec
tion (2), deleted "with a face amount of $100 or
more" after "a check" m Subsection (2)(c), de

leted "if the writing is or purports to be a check
with a face amount of less than $100, all other
forgery is a class A misdemeanor" from the end
of Subsection (3) and made minor stylistic
changes throughout the section
The 1996 amendment, effective April 29,
1996, in Subsection (2) added 'electronic stor
age or transmission' and substituted "valuable
information including forms auch as" for "infor
mation," making related stylistic changes

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Attempt
Attorney signing client's name
Authority to use forged signature
Computer crimes distinguished
Defenses
—Insanity
—Postdated check
Elements of offense
—Makmg and passing
—Passing
—Signature
Evidence
—Handwriting
—Other crimes
—Sufficient
False pretenses distinguished
Fictitious name
Indictment or information
—Variance
Intent
Lesser included offense
"Make" or "utter "
Prescription
Sentencing
Signature
—In general
—Authority to sign another's name
Standard of proof
Theft consolidation rule
Uttering
Verdict
Cited

The crime of attempted forgery involves the
same culpability and dishonesty as does the
crime of forgery itself State v Ross 782 P 2d
529 (Utah Ct App 1989)
Attorney signing client's name.
Section 78-51-32, which authorizes an attorney to execute documents in the name of a
client, does not authorize an attorney to forge a
client's name to a negotiable instrument such
as a settlement check and does not preclude the
attorney's conviction for forgery as a matter of
law when he doe > so, however, when an attorney acts pursuant to the general authority
granted by § 78 51-32 he may not later be
convicted of forgery State v Musselman, 667
P2d 1061 (Utah 1983)
Authority to use forged signature.
Where defendant forged his accomplice's
name on checks which accomplice owned but
had reported stolen, then cashed the checks
and split the proceeds with the accomplice,
defendant committed forgery as denned under
Subsection (1Kb), notwithstanding that the accomplice authouzed defendant to sign his
name State v Collins, 597 P2d 1317 (Utah
1979)

Computer crimes distinguished.
The elements of the computer crimes statute,
§ 76-6-703, are distinct from those of this section, insurance fraud, § 76-6 521, and communications fraud, § 76 10 1801, and, thus, it was
within the prosecutor's discretion to charge and
the trial court's authority to sentence defen
Attempt.
dant for computer crimes, rather than the
Where information charging offense of forg
ery contained one count for forgery and another crimes carrying lesser penalties State v Kent
for uttering, attempt to utter could be shown, 945 P2d 145 (Utah Ct App 1997)
for it was immaterial that attempt to utter was Defenses.
unsuccessful, it was fact of uttering or attempt
mg to utter that was of evidentiary value State —Insanity.
v Green, 89 Utah 437, 57 P2d 750 (1936)
Insanity, if sufficiently established, would
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